

TO FIGHT OR NOT TO FIGHT: THE REVOLUTION CONUNDRUM

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ABSTRACT

The “democratic peace thesis” argues that democracy is desirable because democratic states don’t wage war against each other. It essentially states that democracy is the most stable form of government and stable governments are less prone to war than governments in transition. However, if this is to be relied upon, an odd phenomenon has emerged in the past few decades- the wars for democracy. In this paper, the author explores the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the “humanitarian” intervention in Libya and the Lokpal (Anti-Corruption) Movement in India to understand the role of conflict and co-operation in bringing stability and real democracy to all nations of the world. Using various examples of instances during the afore-mentioned events she argues that conflict and co-operation are not competing means, but values that will lead to stability when used harmoniously and keeping in mind the context of each situation.

KEYWORDS

Democracy; Arab Spring; Lokpal; Revolution; Co-operation; Conflict;

INTRODUCTION

Major political events around the world in the past decade have occurred pursuant to the democratic impulse. Democratic aspirations have moved with mounting force in the world, and any peoples that have felt their contagion has never been the same afterward. The power of the ideals of democracy is so great that even the most militant opponents of democracy must speak the language of democracy to justify themselves to those they rule. The democratic dream is keeping the world on edge. (The Power of the Democratic Idea 1960)

Democracy is a very powerful idea. This is so because the essence of the ideal is to respect the desire of every man to play a part in his own rule. In a democracy, none can be left out, none can be excluded. The world today is faced with several pressing problems and what we need is commitment of the participants

of the democratic process to courageously and affirmatively deal with them. This needs to be done without sacrificing the independence and integrity of the citizens of our globalized world.

Democracy has been popularized in a world in which an overwhelming number of peoples everywhere have come to entertain new expectations about the place they rightfully occupy in their respective societies and the rights they enjoy as a result. This revolution in the moral horizons of people has led to widespread dissatisfaction and turbulence. The vista is exciting but it has brought with it issues that we haven't faced before. Questions about the right ideals and questions about the means to achieve those ideals are being raised every day.

Because of this intrinsic value of democracy, people across the world, aided by the spread of awareness through globalization, are seeking to govern themselves. The integral value of democracy is supplemented by what is popularly called the "democratic peace thesis" which argues that democracy is desirable because democratic states don't wage war against each other. The argument essentially states that democracy is the most stable form of government and stable governments are less prone to war than unstable governments in transition. The democratic peace thesis is widely accepted but has its own bitter critics. However, it still forms a significant part of the foreign policy of various western nations, most notably the United States of America.

If the democratic peace thesis is to be relied upon, an odd phenomenon has emerged in the past few decades- the wars for democracy. The author is perplexed at the hypocrisy in this statement which essentially implies that one must wage war, or to be politically correct, intervene in other nations on humanitarian grounds to prevent wars in the future. But if instability is what leads to war, why must nations contribute to instability? Does installing democracy put an end to instability? Why are the people of various nations choosing armed uprisings as the means of achieving democracy if the ultimate goal is stability? If democratic nations are stable, why are riots and armed uprisings commonplace in certain democratic nations?

In this paper, the author explores the Arab Spring, more specifically the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the "humanitarian" intervention in Libya and the Lokpal (Anti-Corruption) Movement in India to understand the role of conflict and co-operation in bringing stability and real democracy to all nations of the world. In this paper, uprisings have been equated with conflict and post-conflict peace building measures have been equated with co-operation. Using various examples of instances during the aforementioned events the author argues that conflict and co-operation are not competing means, but values that will lead to stability when used harmoniously and keeping in mind the context of each situation. She

further analyzes whether the political system existing in a state impacts the decision of the masses to choose one over the other.

THE ARAB SPRING

In December 2011, Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire to protest the injustice done to him by the police who confiscated his cart for a lack of permit. This act of desperation led to millions of his countrymen taking to the streets to protest the injustices of the status quo in that nation. A month of protests by the people against unemployment and inflation drove out the Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali after 23 years of what can only be called dictatorship. But the Tunisians weren't just expressing economic grievances. On a more fundamental level, the Tunisians were protesting dictatorship. (Angrist 2011) But what happened in Tunisia was just the first rumble in the storm to come. The rebellion proceeded eastwards, skipped Libya and arrived in Cairo which provided it a "stage worthy of its ambition". (Ajami 2012) For three weeks, thousands gathered at Tahrir Square, denounced the security forces and called for *aish*, *karama* and *hurriya*; bread, dignity and freedom. A protest seeking limited reforms transformed into a revolutionary uprising. (Korany and El-Mahdi 2012)

From Cairo, the spirit of the mutiny spread to Yemen and Bahrain. The protests in Egypt and Tunisia gave the former the heart to challenge the ruler they were eager to get rid of. Bahrain, a monarchy, was vulnerable and the eruption of protests turned into a violent sectarian feud. Then came the protest in Libya where the people rose against the tyrant Qaddafi who had ensured that his people were abysmally impoverished in spite of living in the richest African country. The oil in the region brought with it the United States and NATO and the rebels advanced from Benghazi to Tripoli. After two more months of uprising Qaddafi fell to the mob. (NPR 2012)

As authoritarian regimes from Tunis to Manama were rocked by revolution, scholars were quick to identify the Arab Spring's next stop as Syria. (Broning 2011) Even Assad's "legitimate" regime could not remain sheltered from regional turmoil. (Badran 2011) There was chaos in Syria with the regime's brutal response to the uprising. Security forces desecrated mosques, fired at worshipers and committed countless more cruelties. The regime is still in place, but the bond between those who hold power and the people has been broken.

The question we must ask here is what were the underlying problems fostering the discontent of the people and why did they choose the means they did to achieve their goals? At the outset, it must be noted that in Tunisia and Egypt, the revolution was successful; in Jordan, co-operation was successful; Algeria

needed neither. But most of all, it must be noted how Libya and Syria saw all the downsides of conflict as a means to achieve democracy.

THE TUNISIAN TALE

Tunisia was the first domino to fall and is one of the best illustrations of the close relationship of conflict and co-operation to achieve goals. The political system that existed in Tunisia prior to the Revolution was constructed on an idea that legitimacy of a regime could be based on results it delivered to its people. The nation was a model of economic reform and has impressive aggregate economic growth. But Tunisia, behind the external farce, was battling a high unemployment rate¹. Regional economic disparities and growing personal indebtedness only added to the dissatisfaction of the Tunisian middle class.

But, economic malaise alone does not make a revolution, at least not on its own. The political system was strongly authoritarian. Between independence and the Revolution only 2 Presidents led the nation. Although it held presidential and parliamentary elections, they were merely instrumental and held no real meaning. Independent civil society groups were suppressed using restriction on the freedom of speech and assembly and selective use of coercive tactics. Islamists suffered the most severe crackdowns. They were watched, harassed, denied security clearance for formal jobs and sometimes even denied permission to travel abroad. (Noueihed and Warren 2012)

What we need to mark here is that there was no scope for the people to co-operate with the authorities in this case. The conflict which took the form of a Revolution was between the people and an Authoritarian State that did not take into account the interests of the people. The people were fighting for fundamental political transformation, they were fighting for bread, they were fighting for a voice. In the 2009 uprisings in Gafsa people were fighting for bread and employment, in Jarjis social media had triggered a protest for the freedom of expression and the release of political prisoners and in 2011 unemployed university graduates were seeking justice. The people wanted the “Tunisian Economic Miracle” to reach the ordinary man. (Al Jazeera 2011)

The Tunisian dictator Ben Ali fled the country in early 2011 but even in 2013, critics of the government have been gunned down and the government stands dissolved. (Schwartz 2013) We must realize that though co-operation was not the right means to achieve the end the Tunisians sought, it is a means essential to the post conflict development Tunisia seeks. Co-operation is significant in the process of making a peaceful transition to democracy. The Islamist party in power after the elections could not co-

¹ The unemployment rate in Tunisia as reported by the National Institute of Statistics averaged 15.11% from 2005 until 2013.

operate with the secular society it had been elected to govern. They could not reconcile their religious ideals with day to day compromises which good governance demands. Tunisia had an organic revolution, but the battle for a prosperous, democratic Tunisia can only be fought using co-operation.

THE EGYPTIAN EXPERIENCE

Arguments made in terms of the Tunisian experience could be dismissed as inapplicable to other nations fighting their wars for democracy owing to Tunisia's small territorial size. But the Egyptian experience is one that holds great impact. The most populous country in the Arab region, the cradle of political Islam and located in the heart of the Arab region, the impact of the Egyptian revolution on neighbouring civilizations cannot be undermined. The mutiny in Egypt has seen three stages, one which led to the ouster of Hosni Mubarak and the promise of free and fair elections; the second, a year on, against the military junta that held the reins of power but was resistant to reform and keen to limit change; and most recently the downfall of Mohamed Morsy, the leader of the Islamist brotherhood.

Egypt suffered from chronic poverty and the administration had failed in providing adequate infrastructure, services and education to its burgeoning population. Its rapid economic growth led to huge regional disparities and failed to create enough jobs for the large number of young people that entered the labor market year after year with unemployment rate at 9%. About 15% of the Egyptian population moved below the poverty line between 2009 and 2011 according to a joint report by the United Nations World Food Program and the government's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics and the International Food Policy Institute. Inflation was at 11.7% on the eve of the uprising. (Wall Street Journal 2013) The much celebrated economic privatization and liberalization was but an avenue for corruption on an unprecedented scale.

But Egyptians were fighting another enemy alongside dealing with the economic challenges – that of political stagnation. The political regime in Egypt was frozen in time, not adapting to new challenges and aspirations. Egyptians were aware that the multi-party democracy in their nation was a pretense. This was accompanied by the systematic crackdown of the state on the media and cultural expression. In essence, Egyptians had already been pushed to the brink by the time the Tunisian Revolution ousted Ben Ali. The Tunisian experience instilled confidence in Egyptians who took to the streets seeking real change. The Egyptian Revolution was a call for dignity and social justice. At Tahrir Square, Egyptians were asking for a new constitution, the right to free expression, an increased minimum wage, the freedom of association and cancellation of national service on the police force. (Global Voices 2011) It was a realization on part

of the Egyptian people that it was time that they stop being subjects of an authoritarian regime and start being citizens in a democracy.

The uprising in Egypt, also, sees the role of both conflict and co-operation play out. The ouster of Hosni Mubarak required a rebellion, a protest against everything the regime stood for. But the transition to democracy from the control of the military junta required co-operation. A balance had to be found between the interests of the conservative military and the younger activists who were pushing for greater freedoms. Co-operative tactics played a significant role in convincing the ordinary Egyptian that the political and economic system needed to change and the change would not result in chaos that would push them further into poverty.

Egypt rose for democracy, but couldn't see through the transition from revolution to a new state successfully. As the military took over after Mubarak's escape, greater mistrust pervaded Egypt. They weren't neutral guardians of the State, they were just another part of what the Egyptians were protesting. Egypt's progress is halting, because unlike when they first poured into Tahrir Square, the people are not united. The Islamists want God's law in Egypt in a direct challenge to the liberals and the leftists. The Islamists needed to co-operate with these factions and give them a "civil state" if not a "secular state". (Noueihed and Warren 2012) And when they failed, Tahrir Square was filled again with Egyptians calling for the ouster of Morsy, some who wanted Mubarak back, others who were disappointed by Morsy. Co-operation is what is lacking in Egypt with infighting inherent in the opposition and cohesiveness being second nature for the Muslim brotherhood. (CNN 2013)

If the rules aren't changed and the entire system isn't cleaned up, a new elite will simply step up to replace the old. Co-operation needs to give meaning to the conflict, and real change is needed in Egypt. For now, Egypt's real revolution has only just begun.

ARAB SPRING, LIBYAN WINTER

While Tunisia successfully ousted the reigning autocrat and Egypt has been fighting one incumbent after another, Libya collapsed into a protracted civil war. For four decades, Qaddafi had consolidated his rule in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by patronage to kings and clans. He had artificially induced scarcity in a resource rich state in everything from simple consumer products to basic medical care, generating widespread corruption. Over time, the trust the people of Libya had in their government and in one another eroded and they took refuge in the solace of clan and family, creating deep fractures in Libyan society. Therefore, what were mostly non-violent protests in Egypt and Tunisia, Libya experienced as

multiple secessions from a failed state, in the absence of a strong center and in the presence of abundant weapons.

Libyans weren't protesting a rise in food prices like Egypt in Tunisia. They weren't even protesting the distress the 2007 global credit crunch brought with it. Other issues took center stage in Libya. Libyans were angry at the suppression of genuine democratic opportunities for the population. (Prashad 2012) Students were hanged in public for dissenting against Gaddafi in 1977. (The Harvard Crimson 2012) The dictator is also being accused of committing grave human rights violations in the late 1970s and early 1980s while forcing the Libyan people to adopt the ideals behind The Green Book and also for massacring 1200 political prisoners in 1996. (Al Arabiya 2011) But, at this stage, it must be said, that though the revolution occurred in Libya, it only started because of the inspiration provided by Egypt and Tunisia and was only successful because of controversial military intervention that has been variously described as everything from a neo-imperial regime change to a humanitarian rescue mission and even democratization. The intervention that drove Libya's revolt but led to a conflict that killed tens of thousands of people armed hundreds of thousands more. (Noueihed and Warren 2012)

On the outside, Libya seemed to be on the path to progress. In 2008, foreign investment had risen from \$143 million in 2003 to \$4.7 billion in 2008. (Noueihed and Warren 2012) Tourism had picked up. It was a laissez faire rule bending economy where anything could be done. It wasn't just economic optimism. From the political standpoint, it was setting an example for what could be achieved through international diplomacy. Gaddafi's own son Saif was calling for an independent media and an independent civic society. But Gaddafi's regime in Libya was not a monolithic autocracy. It had cracks and splits, volatility and confusion. Gaddafi may have had hardcore supporters, but there was no dearth of opponents. Before long, dismay spread, commercial trust eroded and corruption had corroded Gaddafi's Libya. Government policies had failed to meet the expectations of the people. The youth of Libya that didn't have the right political connections couldn't find jobs or run successful businesses. The healthcare system was an object of mistrusts and infrastructure had not kept pace with economic growth. And unlike what Gaddafi believed, the Libyan Jamahiriya had not delivered what protesters in Tunisia and Egypt were demanding.

On February 17, 2011, residents of Benghazi took the streets peacefully protesting the regime. It's hard to piece together the change of events, but relatively quickly the protests turned into a large scale armed insurrection. Cities in Libya began to fall like dominos into rebel hands. Senior figures in the Libyan government started to defect. But a mixture of terror, apathy and popular support kept Gaddafi in power and in spite of defections, the disorganized rebels had begun to lose support. But the way Gaddafi and his forces reacted to the rebellion made it seem like a humanitarian threat to the western world. Resolution

1973 was tabled, passed and on March 18, French jets launched air strikes on Gaddafi's forces outside Benghazi. The coalition was soon joined by other armed forces. Soon, NATO intervened and Libya saw a spring and a summer of aircrafts, tanks and artillery batter their nation. Almost 50,000 people had lost their lives before September, the semblance of an alternate structure of governance had been put in place in the form of the NTC, but the conflict only really ended when on October 20, pictures of Gaddafi's dead body were slapped across the front pages of newspapers across the world. (Prashad 2012)

It is hard to answer whether Libya was a legitimate target or even if this intervention was successful. But what we do know is that only the first phase of the battle is over. In September 2011, the UN set in motion the process of building a new Libyan state with its support mission to assist their political transition. By October 2012, the Libyans had set up a new government and elected a new Prime Minister after elections for a General National Congress. The interim government is working on a new constitution and is expected to hold fresh parliamentary elections in 2013. (BBC News Africa 2013)

The social and governmental fragmentation in Libya continues to exist and that may not be amenable to a transition to democracy. For democracy to emerge and flourish, Libya needs to first establish law and order, security that the people haven't experienced in four decades. Trust must be revived across clans, public administration needs to be reconstructed and people need to find with themselves a desire to govern themselves. Therefore, we must understand that Libya doesn't just face the challenge of democratization, it faces the challenge of state formation. The conflict brought with it the realization of the ultimate objective, but it is co-operation that will help them achieve this objective. Libya may have achieved, for now, the most far-reaching change of any country in the Arab Spring, but it is also the country which bears the highest risk of losing all the progress they've made and descending into a downward spiral of violent instability.

LOKPAL FOR INDIA

The challenge doesn't just lie in democratizing a nation. The real challenge is setting up and allowing a democracy to thrive and the people to flourish under its auspices. Democracy embodies both conflict and co-operation because it holds no value if people cannot oppose state action or cannot contribute to the government they give to themselves. Democracy is self-realization, the freedom of expression and governing yourself. Conflict and co-operation don't compete in a democracy, they are like the two wheels of a cart, which need to co-exist for the cart to be set in motion. They need to exist in harmony the importance of neither one can be belied.

India is the largest and fastest growing democracy in the world. But the democratic values enshrined in the Constitution of India face democracy's various challenges every day, some of which it overcomes, some of which continue to threaten its existence. One major threat to democracy in India, is one it shares with all the countries of the Arab world that rose in revolt in 2011- the plague of corruption. Corruption is rife in every aspect of Indian life. Whether it is admissions in universities, getting a passport or even aid from the welfare state for those living below the poverty line, corruption in India is ubiquitous. However, in 2011, after a string of major corruption scandals in the government, the people of India had had enough.

For over a week in the August of 2011, New Delhi's Ramlila Maidan took on the air of Cairo's Tahrir Square. It was the season of revolution. Anna Hazare and his anti-corruption campaign gave voice to India's middle class which was growing tired of public indignities. India had been rocked by a series of corruption scandals. The first strike was the telecom spectrum scandal where a former minister was accused of selling bandwidth on a "first come first serve" basis instead of a public auction, to those companies who paid him and his aid huge bribes. Auditors have estimated that the alleged mis-selling of the licenses cost the public exchequer nearly \$40bn in lost revenue. The Commonwealth Games organized in New Delhi failed to "signal to the world that India is[was] rapidly marching ahead with confidence" (Srivastava 2010) and instead became better known for \$80 toilet paper. In August, 2011, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India tabled a report in Parliament stating that the preparation for the Games was deeply flawed, riddled with favoritism and vastly over budget. In addition, the report claimed serious irregularities with bidding and contracts. The games cost \$4.1 bn instead of \$270mn as initially estimated and brought in revenue of only \$38mn. (India 2011-12) Besides the aforementioned, there were allegations of illegal mining, the WikiLeaks cash-for-votes scandal and even the allotment of homes for war widows at below market rates to politicians, senior bureaucrats and their families. (BBC News South Asia 2012)

It was not just major scandals; corruption had taken the shape of a fundamental problem affecting almost every aspect of Indian society, affecting every citizen on a day to day basis. The exasperation of the Indian people translated into a passionate response to Anna Hazare's call for a hunger strike. An exceptional use of social media along with Gandhian symbolism helped draw out even more supporters. The Arab springs had "suddenly made change possible" (Bellows 2011) and Indians were craving change.

The demand they were making was the enactment of the Jan Lokpal Bill, a legislation aimed at setting up a Central body to investigate and prosecute corruption in the Indian government with powers that violated the federal and democratic ideals of democracy that the Indian constitution stood for and repeated attempts at talks between the government and the protesters failed. This did not fuel the protest for the

reason that the demands that the leadership of the protesters was making were not only unconstitutional but also unfeasible and didn't address the reasons corruption was rife in Indian society. (Bansal 2011) The government, threatened by the intensity of the revolution, went overboard and suppressed a non-violent protest at Ramlila Maidan using brutal police force. (Times of India 2012)

The Lokpal movement in India is being used here as an example of a movement that powerfully expresses the anger of the people against the establishment in a nation where the people chose the government as their leaders and representatives, not as their rulers. In this case study, we will see how the inclination of both the government and the people towards conflict saw both lose. The protesters could not achieve what they were seeking and the state lost legitimacy. The former by proposing solutions that bordered on unreasonability and the latter by exercising control in a way to squelch the protest which only shows a dangerous trend in Indian democracy.

The conflict i.e. the Hazare revolution galvanized a consciousness among the arguably apathetic Indian people. However, the complete absence of the co-operative intent among the leaders of the revolution has destroyed its own historical achievement. The protesters saw the conflict as having only two sides. By not co-operating with all the other stakeholders, they lost efficacy and legitimacy. (Mehta 2011) In conclusion, we can say that two major lessons have emerged from the Jan Lokpal revolution- one good, one bad. The good news is that India people have risen against corruption and are ready to participate in law making. The negative is that when the revolutionaries don't co-operate with all the stakeholders, no real change occurs.

Democracy should be understood as a fundamental mode of self-realization, a means of protecting citizens from arbitrary rule and expressing their preferences. (Held 2006) It must deliver what people need in terms of economic growth, stability, personal as well as societal security, its fate will be even more fragile than that of autocratic regimes. And so we must know that conflict doesn't end in a democracy, it just takes a constitutional form and co-exists with co-operation. In fact, that in itself is the essence of democracy.

WAS CONFLICT BETTER THAN CO-OPERATION

In the various illustrations used in this paper, the author has tried to understand what drove the masses to revolt in the way they did. If you study the commonalities in the aforementioned examples you see that first, all those societies were experiencing deep seated discontent against the Center. Social Contract Theory tells us that people gave up several rights and freedoms in lieu of the protection the government would extend to them and the order it would bring with it. However, when the governments fail to live up

to their end of the bargain, people have, what Locke described as, the right of revolution. (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2010) It is this combination of consent and revolution that ensures accountability, an ideal fervently pursued in today's world.

When people saw that the governments that they were co-operating with were violating the very natural rights they held in trust, they realized that there was no room for co-operation. Their battle was to be fought against an enemy with far superior means. An enemy who exercised greater power than each one of them, but not more than all of them together. It was this sentiment that helped them collectivize and it was the realization that co-operation would be futile against a tyrant that drove them to an uprising. In that light, the author notes that normatively conflict may not be better than co-operation, but for the revolting peoples, conflict was the sole alternative.

The next question that arises is if the people would have adopted similar means if they had chosen the government that exercised authority over them. Here,

CONCLUSION

“The capacity to know when to use hard power, when to use soft power, and when to combine the two, I call smart power.”

- Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Karl Marx used the analogy of a burrowing mole to explain an effective revolution. A mole, he explained, burrows through the ground to make tunnels and breaks above ground when you least expect it. The mole breaking free to the surface provides that part of the Revolution that is spectacular; but if it hasn't burrowed effectively i.e., if the revolution hasn't taken into account the real grievances of the people and produced institutions capable of resolving them, then the revolution would have emerged in history, but would have rendered itself futile. What this implies in terms of the question of whether conflict is better than co-operation is that Conflict like revolution would help you make a mark in history, but without co-operation, a strong resolution of the problem at hand would not be in place.

Revolutions are the beginning of a long process. The post-revolution high wears off quickly and divisions among the leaders of the movement begin to surface. Conservatives, populists, Islamists, modern reformers will vie for power in these fledgling democracies but these nations are now going to face the real task. The challenge will be to co-operate with all groups that play by democratic rules, to understand

always that their nation will flourish when everyone's interests are accounted for and successful democracies will provide all the support they can in terms of institution building. (Mullerson 2008)

Over the course of this paper, we have explored a few important global events in the last few years, events that could fundamentally change the global landscape. They were revolutions for democracy or revolutions within democracy. Democracy is a means and an end and is arguably the most sought after goal of human civilization today. Over time, with the spread of awareness and knowledge across borders, peoples across the world have come to value this ideal greatly and have begun to find for the right to govern themselves. If people are given the right to govern themselves, it will lead to self-realization and ensuing stability and peace. And the Arab Revolutions of 2011 are prime examples of the claim that people have found that waging war against their own states is necessary for them to ultimately achieve stability. Conflict was essential for change. In fact, conflict, for them, was the only medium through which they could achieve change.

On studying the progress of the Arab revolutions and the events that occurred after the fall of autocratic and tyrannical regimes, one realizes that although conflict was essential to starting the process of change, it was only the first step. For democracy to truly exist in a nation, co-operation is indispensable. This is because of the nature of democracy which makes each man's opinion relevant. Co-operation between the various stakeholders in a nation is necessary for them to arrive at a mode of governance that is appropriate to their context and will help them all flourish. Only when everyone is satiated, their interests integrated, will they be unified and the nation will be stable.

But the role of conflict and co-operation doesn't end at state-building. The survival of a democratic nation state requires constant use of conflict and co-operation. A stagnant society is like the calm before a storm and so conflict and co-operation are a continuous process. We see that claim play out in the form of the Anti-Corruption Movement of 2011 in India. The people of India, tired of the corrupt practices by the government in power, rose in revolt using peaceful protests and hunger strikes as their weapons. The government didn't unreasonably crack down upon them, barring one incident. However, they could not achieve their objective as the Lokpal Bill they were pushing for only created a toothless body. This was predominantly because there was a complete absence of co-operation between the various stakeholders. Unreasonable demands of some leaders were not toned down; the members of Parliament, themselves corrupt, did not want the body to have real powers; the interests of important stakeholders such as industrialists were not taken into account and no real experts were called in for drafting this legislation.

Therefore, we see from the case studies adopted, that conflict and co-operation are both important for democracy. One does not take absolute precedence over the other. In fact, both have different roles to

play in the context of democracy. It is important to use them harmoniously to achieve the objectives of civilization because, together, they are a formidable weapon in the hands of the people.

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